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1  Introduction 
 
That a large proportion of international trade is trade in intermediate goods has been known 
since the seminal work of Grubel and Lloyd (1975). Such trade may be viewed as the next 
step in economic globalisation: if the production process can be broken into several stages, 
then each stage may be produced in the country that has a comparative advantage in 
producing that stage. Therefore, trade in intermediate goods should lead to additional gains 
above those associated with trade in final goods alone.  
 
The original motivation for this paper is a paper by Paul Samuelson (2001) in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, where he developed a Ricardian (1817) model of international trade in 
which each of two final goods can also be used as intermediate inputs in the production of the 
other final good. International trade results in a much larger gain than would otherwise be 
obtained if goods could not be used as intermediate inputs. Samuelson attributed the insight 
of using final goods as intermediate goods to Sraffa (1960); Samuelson’s (2001) contribution 
was to introduce the international dimension to Sraffa’s idea. Since Samuelson’s 
contribution, Shiozawa (2007, 2009) has extended the Ricardo-Sraffa model to many goods 
and many countries, while Fujimoto and Shiozawa (2011a, b) consider how the model can be 
used to analyse both inter- and intra-industry competition and trade.  
 
In this paper we extend and generalise the model developed by Samuelson (2001). Whilst 
Samuelson specified that the intermediate inputs are the same as final goods, we decouple 
intermediates from final goods. This enables us to consider more possible configurations of 
production than Samuelson’s two (trade in final goods only, and trade in both intermediate 
and final goods). Here, we consider both domestic and international outsourcing of 
production; for instance, Fort (2013) shows for a sample of US manufacturers that domestic 
outsourcing is much more prevalent than international outsourcing. Further, we introduce 
trade costs and the cost of coordinating intermediates into the model, and show how changing 
these costs can change not only the quantity of goods produced and traded, but also change 
the configuration of production in the global economy.  
 
Changes in the structure of production are a key feature of the modern economy. Consider for 
instance the automobile industry. With Henry Ford’s introduction of the moving assembly 
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line in 1913, the time it took to build a car was reduced from over 12 hours to less than six 
hours (Gross, 1997). A key feature of the Ford assembly line was the integration of the entire 
production process. Gross (1997) notes:  
 
“…[In 1921] Ford was free to embark on a great new project: the design and 
construction of the world's largest and most efficient automobile factory at River 
Rouge, near Detroit. Arrayed over 2,000 acres, it would include 90 miles of 
railroad track and enough space for 75,000 employees to produce finished cars 
from raw material in the span of just forty-one hours. River Rouge had its own 
power plant, iron forges, and fabricating facilities.” (Gross, 1997, p. 85).   
 
Contrast this to the 3rd generation Apple iPod (released in 2003), for which the hard drive was 
manufactured in China (as was the final assembly), the display in Japan, the video processor 
in Taiwan or Singapore, the CPU in the US or Taiwan, and the memory in Korea (Linden et 
al, 2007). Sturgeon (2002) documents this trend in modular production networks, while 
Brown and Linden (2005) discuss offshoring in the semiconductor industry. Offshoring has 
been the topic of a US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional 
Committees (US Government Accountability Office, 2006).  
 
International trade in intermediate goods and the international fragmentation of production 
have been subjects of a large amount of research. An early formulation was provided in a 
monopolistic competition model by Ethier (1982). More directly related to the international 
fragmentation of production are Jones and Sanyal (1982), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990), and 
the literature summarised by Jones’s Ohlin lectures (Jones, 2000). Of this early work, the 
present paper is most closely related to Sanyal (1983), in which the production of both the 
two final goods is divided into two stages. In Sanyal (1983), production of each final good 
must occur via production of intermediates, whereas in Samuelson (2001) and the present 
paper, firms endogenously choose whether to produce the final good by means of 
intermediate goods or by means of direct production.  
 
More recent literature on the international fragmentation of production includes Yi (2003), 
who develops a perfectly competitive model of vertical specialisation. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996, 1997) develop a model of offshoring based on the many-good Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, while Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) develop a model of international trade in 
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tasks, and Rodriguez-Clare’s (2010) model extends the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to 
allow for offshoring. Compared to this work, the present paper does not assume that the 
production process must be divided into many steps, instead allowing it to be a choice made 
by firms. In this sense the paper is similar to Antras (2003), who analyses the situations in 
which firms will choose to engage in arms-length international outsourcing as opposed to 
producing abroad as a multinational firm. Unlike Antras (2003), where contract 
incompleteness and intra-firm trade take centre stage, in the present paper the equilibrium 
structure of production is determined solely by cost considerations, and all transactions are 
assumed to take place between rather than within firms. The existing literature has been ably 
summarised in Feenstra’s Ohlin lectures (Feenstra, 2009).  
 
A key result of the model developed in this paper is that both domestic and foreign 
outsourcing lead to productivity gains. This is distinct from some of the literature such as 
Antras and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al (2004), in which firms have innate differences 
in their productivity, and these differences are what drives the structure of production 
(although see Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a model of offshoring without heterogeneity 
across firms). The empirical evidence has shown strong support for the idea that both 
domestic and foreign outsourcing have positive effects on productivity, controlling for the 
endogeneity of outsourcing. Recent work in this area includes Amiti and Wei (2006), Gorg et 
al (2008), Knittel and Stango (2012) and Fort (2013). Olsen (2006) offers a review of the 
literature, while Houseman (2007) warns of measurement problems in productivity in the 
presence of outsourcing and offshoring.   
 
The next section develops the model and the possible outcomes under autarky. Section 3 
shows what happens when international trade is allowed. Section 4 provides some concluding 
comments.  
 
2 The model: Autarky 
 
Because our primary interest is in the implications of the different structures of production 
that emerge in the model, throughout the paper we shall focus on situations where both 
sectors adopt the same production structure; situations in which each sector adopts different 
production structures may be analysed by comparison with the situations discussed below.  
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 2.1 Direct production 
 
First consider the model with no international trade, for the case where there are no 
intermediate goods. There are two final goods, 𝑋1 and 𝑋2. Utility takes the following Cobb-
Douglas form:  
𝑈 =  𝐶𝑋1𝛼  𝐶𝑋21−𝛼                                        0 <  𝛼 <  1     (1) 
All markets are perfectly competitive. Labour is the only factor of production, and is 
inelastically supplied. The labour endowment is 𝐿�. The production functions exhibit constant 
returns to scale and take the following form:  
𝑄𝑋1  =  𝐴𝑋1𝐿𝑋1                                          𝑄𝑋2  =  𝐴𝑋2  𝐿𝑋2      (2) 
Where 𝐴𝑋1 and 𝐴𝑋2 are the productivity parameters. Call these the direct production 
functions, since they employ labour to produce final goods directly. From the consumer’s 
first order conditions and the firm’s zero profit conditions we have:  
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2
 =  𝐴𝑋2
𝐴𝑋1





�      (3) 
From equation (3) and the goods and labour market clearing conditions, the labour used in 
each good is given by:  
𝐿𝑋1  =  𝛼𝐿�                                         𝐿𝑋2  =  (1 − 𝛼)𝐿�      (4) 
Hence, output of each good is:  
𝑄𝑋1  =  𝐴𝑋1𝛼𝐿�                               𝑄𝑋2  =  𝐴𝑋2  (1− 𝛼)𝐿�     (5) 
So national utility under direct production is:  
𝑈𝐷  =  �𝐴𝑋1𝛼�𝛼�𝐴𝑋2(1 − 𝛼)�1−𝛼𝐿�      (6) 
This provides us with a benchmark with which to compare the results for different 
organisational forms below.  
 
2.2 Indirect production 
 
Now suppose that in addition to the production functions above, there is another way of 
producing the two final goods 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 involving the use of intermediate inputs 𝑌1 and 𝑌2. 
Let 𝑌1 be used only in the production of 𝑋1, and 𝑌2 be used only in the production of 𝑋2. 
Suppose these indirect production functions take the following fixed-proportions form:  
𝑄𝑋1  =  min�𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 , 𝐴𝑋11𝑄𝑌1  �     (7a) 
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𝑄𝑋2  =  min�𝐴𝑋02𝐿𝑋02 , 𝐴𝑋22𝑄𝑌2�     (7b) 
Where, as before, the 𝐴 terms represent productivity parameters. That is, under indirect 
production, production of 𝑋1 requires the use of both labour and 𝑌1, and production of 𝑋2 
requires both labour and 𝑌2. This is the main point of departure between our model and that 
of Samuelson (2001), where 𝑋1 is used in the production of 𝑋2, and vice versa. Following 
Samuelson (2001), suppose that indirect production occurs in both final goods sectors. Let 
the production functions of the intermediate inputs take the following form:  
𝑄𝑌1  =  𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1                                𝑄𝑌2  =  𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2     (8) 
The cost functions for the final goods 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 under indirect production are:  
𝑝𝑋1  =  𝑤𝐴𝑋01 + 𝑝𝑌1𝐴𝑋11                                𝑝𝑋2  =  𝑤𝐴𝑋02 + 𝑝𝑌2𝐴𝑋22    (9) 
Since the cost functions of the intermediate goods 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 are  
𝑝𝑌1 = 𝑤𝐴𝑌1                                               𝑝𝑌2 = 𝑤𝐴𝑌2     (10) 
Substituting (10) into the cost functions for the final goods (9) and solving gives:  
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2




𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02�  =  𝛼1−𝛼 �𝐶𝑋2𝐶𝑋1�    (11) 
Since consumption equals output in autarky, substituting from the production functions (7a), 
(7b) and (8) above gives the ratio of the consumption of the two final goods:  
𝐶𝑋2
𝐶𝑋1
 =  𝐴𝑋02𝐿𝑋02
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01
 =  𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2
𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1
     (12) 











𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02�    (13a) 
𝐿𝑌2
𝐿𝑌1







𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02�     (13b) 
In addition, from the production functions (7a) and (7b), since labour and intermediate inputs 
are used in fixed proportions, we have:  
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01  =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1                ↔                 𝐿𝑋01  =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋01 𝐿𝑌1   (14a) 
𝐴𝑋02𝐿𝑋02  =  𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2                ↔                 𝐿𝑋02  =  𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋02 𝐿𝑌2   (14b) 
Full employment implies that 𝐿𝑋01 +  𝐿𝑋02 +  𝐿𝑌1 +  𝐿𝑌2 =  𝐿�. Substituting from (13a), (13b), 
(14a) and (14b) into this expression and simplifying gives the following expressions for the 
labour used in each of the four sectors:  
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𝐿𝑌1  =  𝛼𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01                                            𝐿𝑌2  =  (1−𝛼)𝐴𝑋02𝐿�𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02   (15a) 
𝐿𝑋01  =  𝛼𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11  𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01                                           𝐿𝑋02  =  (1−𝛼)𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22𝐿�𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02   (15b) 
Note that 𝐿𝑌1 + 𝐿𝑋01 = 𝛼𝐿� and 𝐿𝑌2 + 𝐿𝑋02 = (1 − 𝛼)𝐿�; total labour employed in each sector 
is the same as under direct production, and does not depend on the technology parameters. 
Substituting (15a) and (15b) into the production functions (7a), (7b) and (8) and the utility 
function (1) enables us to solve for national utility under indirect production:  
𝑈𝐼  =  �𝛼𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑋01  𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01�𝛼 �(1−𝛼)𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑋02𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02 �1−𝛼 𝐿�    (16) 
There are gains from indirect production provided 𝑈𝐼  >  𝑈𝐷. This will be the case if the 
technology parameters associated with indirect production are sufficiently large relative to 
the technology parameters associated with direct production. That is, firms will endogenously 
choose indirect production instead of direct production if there are productivity gains from 
indirect production. Note that it is possible for there to be direct production in one sector but 
not in the other sector; this again depends on the technology parameters.  
 
2.3 Coordination costs 
 
Now suppose that there are coordination costs involved in engaging in indirect production. 
These may be the costs of contracting with input suppliers, or the transport cost of shipping 
the intermediate good to the final good producer, or the cost of coordinating specifications of 
inputs. There are no coordination costs involved with direct production. Suppose that the 
coordination cost is the same across goods. Let 𝛽 <  1 be the fraction of a final good that is 
available for consumption after incurring the coordination cost involved in indirect 
production; 1 − 𝛽 is therefore the coordination cost, with lower values of 𝛽 indicating higher 
coordination cost. Hence coordination costs are analogous to iceberg-type trade costs, and 
parallel the use of these costs in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The indirect 
production functions will become:  
𝑄𝑋1  =  min�𝛽𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 , 𝛽𝐴𝑋11𝑄𝑌1�     (17a) 
𝑄𝑋2  =  min�𝛽𝐴𝑋02𝐿𝑋02 , 𝛽𝐴𝑋22𝑄𝑌2�     (17b) 
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Because the coordination cost is assumed to be identical across goods, it has no impact on 
relative prices and consumption if both sectors engage in indirect production3:  
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2




𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02�    (18) 
𝐶𝑋2
𝐶𝑋1
 =  𝐴𝑋02𝐿𝑋02
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01
 =  𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2
𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1
     (19) 
Hence there is also no impact on the labour used in each sector; the expressions in equations 
(15a) and (15b) continue to hold. Output of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 through indirect production are given 
by:   
𝑄𝑋1  =  𝛼𝛽𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11  𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01                       𝑄𝑋2  =  (1−𝛼)𝛽𝐴𝑋02𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22𝐿�𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02    (20) 
As before, indirect production will be used if output via this means exceeds that through 
direct production. Equation (20) shows that the coordination cost acts as a productivity cost 
to the firm. Thus it can be seen that high coordination costs will reduce the likelihood that 
indirect production will be chosen instead of direct production. That is, firms will trade off 
possible productivity gains from indirect production against the productivity loss from the 
coordination cost. Comparing the outputs in equation (20) with those in equation (5) allows 
us to solve for the threshold value of 𝛽 above which firms will decide to engage in indirect as 
opposed to direct production:  
𝛽1�  =  𝐴𝑋1�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01�𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11                      𝛽2�  =  𝐴𝑋2�𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+ 𝐴𝑋02�𝐴𝑋02𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22     (21) 
 
3 The international organisation of production 
 
In this section we extend the model above to allow for international trade. Trade is always 
assumed to be balanced. In the first two subsections below, we assume no trade or 
coordination costs; these are introduced in the following sections. Suppose there are two 
countries, Home and Foreign, with Foreign variables denoted with an asterisk. Consumer 
preferences are identical in the two countries. In the previous section we have been flexible 
with regards to the precise magnitudes of various parameters. In this section, to make 
progress (and to prevent the paper from degenerating into a taxonomy of possible cases), we 
make the following assumptions with regard to the parameter values of the model4, and in all 
3 The coordination cost will of course affect relative prices if one sector engages in direct production (and hence 
avoids the coordination cost), while the other sector engages in indirect production.  
4 These values are different from those in Samuelson (2001), and have been chosen to illustrate the key features 
of the model. Appendix D shows the outcome of the model using Samuelson’s parameter values.  
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cases focus on equilibria in which firms in both sectors choose the same structure of 
production, whether direct or indirect:  
𝐴𝑋1 =  4                     𝐴𝑋2 =  2                     𝐴𝑌1 =  4                     𝐴𝑌2 =  8    (22a) 
𝐴𝑋01 =  𝐴𝑋11 = 8                                          𝐴𝑋02 =  𝐴𝑋22 = 4     (22b) 
𝐴𝑋1
∗ =  2                     𝐴𝑋2∗ =  4                     𝐴𝑌1∗ =  8                     𝐴𝑌2∗ =  4   (22c) 
𝐴𝑋01
∗ =  𝐴𝑋11∗ = 4                                          𝐴𝑋02∗ =  𝐴𝑋22∗ = 8    (22d) 
𝛼 =  0.5                                                          𝐿�  =  𝐿∗� =  2     (22e) 
Hence the two countries are symmetric in terms of their technology. In terms of direct 
production, Home has a comparative advantage in the production of 𝑋1. On the other hand, in 
terms of indirect production, Foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of 𝑌1, 
which is used in the production of 𝑋1. However, Home still has a comparative advantage in 
assembling 𝑋1 from 𝑌1. Both countries are assumed to be the same size, and the two goods 
are symmetric from the consumer’s viewpoint5.  
 
As a basis for comparison with the results below, note that, given the parameter values above, 
if there are no coordination or trade costs, then in autarky, under direct production, each 
country’s utility is 2.83. Under indirect production, each country’s utility is 4.77, an increase 
of 69 percent over utility under direct production. Hence given the parameter values, there is 
a productivity gain from indirect production. Also, the threshold values for 𝛽1� and 𝛽2� are 0.63 
and 0.56 for Home, and vice versa for Foreign. That is, if 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are lower than these 
values, the productivity cost of coordinating inputs from suppliers outweighs the productivity 
benefits of indirect production, and both countries would produce both goods using direct 
rather than indirect means.  
 
3.1 No trade and coordination costs: International trade in final goods only 
 
There are two sub-cases here. First, parameter values may be such that indirect production 
will occur in both countries. Second, parameter values may be such that direct production 
will occur in both countries.  
 
5 The symmetry of the model makes it much easier to solve, although where possible, to obtain more general 
results we will not rely on symmetry.  
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Consider first the case of indirect production. In this case, since Home has a comparative 
advantage in the production of 𝑋1, Home will specialise in the production of 𝑋1 and will 
export 𝑋1 in exchange for imports of 𝑋2 from Foreign. The equilibrium conditions are shown 
in Appendix A, and are obtained following the same steps as in Section 2 above. Substituting 
the expressions for relative labour demands (A4), (A5), (A6) and (A7) into the labour market 
clearing condition (A8) for the two countries and solving for labour in each sector, we have:  
𝐿𝑌1  =  𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01                                  𝐿𝑋01  =  𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11  𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01   (23a) 
𝐿𝑌2
∗  =  𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿∗�
𝐴𝑌2
∗ 𝐴𝑋22
∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗                                 𝐿𝑋02∗  =  𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐿∗�𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗    (23b) 
Because each country is specialised in its comparative advantage final good, its share of 
world income is equal to the share of this good in consumer expenditure. Hence, substituting 
from the labour allocation equations (23a) and (23b) into the production functions (7a) and 
(7b) and then into the utility function (1), the expression for utility in the two countries is:  
𝑈𝐻  =  𝛼 �𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11  𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01�𝛼 �𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿∗�𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗ �1−𝛼    (24a) 
𝑈𝐹  =  (1 − 𝛼) �𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11  𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01�𝛼 �𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿∗�𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗ �1−𝛼    (24b) 
Assuming no trade or coordination costs, substituting the parameter values into this 
expression and solving yields utility of 6.4 in both countries. This is higher than under 
autarky with indirect production, so there are gains from trade in final goods.  
 
The other case is when parameter values are such that direct production occurs in each 
country, and then each final good is exported to the other country. In that case, all Home 
labour 𝐿� is used in producing 𝑋1, while all Foreign labour 𝐿∗�  is used in producing 𝑋2, so in 
the absence of trade costs, since specialising in 𝑋1 gives Home a share 𝛼 of world income, we 
have:  
𝑈𝐻  =  𝛼�𝐴𝑋1𝐿��𝛼�𝐴𝑋2∗ 𝐿∗� �1−𝛼                     𝑈𝐹  =  (1 − 𝛼)�𝐴𝑋1𝐿��𝛼�𝐴𝑋2∗ 𝐿∗� �1−𝛼  (25) 
Given the parameter values assumed above, utility in both countries is equal to 4.0. What this 
tells us is that there are productivity gains from specialisation and trade, but that given the 
parameter values, the gain from indirect domestic production under autarky is larger than the 
gain from direct production combined with international trade. Clearly the combination of 




3.2 No trade and coordination costs: International trade in both intermediate and 
final goods  
 
If international trade is allowed in both intermediate and final goods, then Home will 
specialise in production of 𝑌2, which it will export to Foreign in exchange for 𝑌1, which 
Home will then use in production of 𝑋1, exporting it to Foreign in exchange for 𝑋2. Since the 
two countries are symmetric in every way, wages are equalised in the two countries. The 
equilibrium conditions are shown in Appendix B. As before, substituting from the labour 
demand conditions (B5), (B6), (B7) and (B8) into the labour market clearing conditions for 
the two countries (B9) and simplifying gives the following expressions for the labour used in 
each of the four sectors:  
𝐿𝑋01  =  [𝐵]−1𝐿�                                         𝐿𝑌2  =  (1 − [𝐵]−1)𝐿�   (26a) 
𝐿𝑋02
∗  =   [𝐷]−1𝐿∗�                                        𝐿𝑌1∗  =  (1 − [𝐷]−1)𝐿∗�    (26b) 























�     (27b) 
Substituting (26a) and (26b) into the production functions (7a), (7b) and (8) yields the output 
of each of the two final goods 𝑋1 and 𝑋2. Consumption of each final good in each country 
depends on national income; however, national income (defined as the value of final good 
output) now depends on the value of both countries’ final good, since each country also 
produces the intermediate good which is used in the other country. The symmetry of the 
model allows us to normalise wages in both countries to 1. From equation (B1) in Appendix 
B, the price of 𝑋1 is:  
𝑝𝑋1  =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗        (28) 
Hence, substituting from the production function (7a) and the labour demand (26a), the value 
of Home’s output of 𝑋1 is:  
𝑝𝑋1𝑄𝑋1  =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ [𝐵] 𝐿�      (29) 
Home’s GDP may be defined as the total value of output minus the value of intermediate 
goods used: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻 = 𝑝𝑋1𝑄𝑋1 − 𝑝𝑌1∗ 𝑄𝑌1∗ + 𝑝𝑌2𝑄𝑌2     (30) 
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= 𝑝𝑋1𝑄𝑋1 − 𝐿𝑌1∗ + 𝐿𝑌2        = 𝑝𝑋1𝑄𝑋1        
Where the second equality comes from substituting from the cost functions (10) and the 
production functions (8) for 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 into the above expression, and the third equality comes 
from the assumption of symmetry between the two countries. Foreign’s GDP is, analogously:  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹 = 𝑝𝑋2∗ 𝑄𝑋2∗  =  𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2+𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2[𝐷] 𝐿∗�       (31) 
Home’s share of world income is therefore:  
𝑆𝐻  =  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻+𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐹  =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ [𝐵] 𝐿�  �𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01
𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1
∗ [𝐵] 𝐿�� + �𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2+𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2[𝐷] 𝐿∗� �    (32) 
Since preferences are homothetic, we can then make use of this to obtain the equilibrium 
consumption levels in each country:  
𝐶𝑋1  =  𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑋01[𝐵]−1𝐿�                       𝐶𝑋1∗  =  (1 − 𝑆𝐻)𝐴𝑋01[𝐵]−1𝐿�  (33a) 
𝐶𝑋2  =  𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑋02∗ [𝐷]−1𝐿∗�                      𝐶𝑋2∗  =  (1 − 𝑆𝐻)𝐴𝑋02∗ [𝐷]−1𝐿∗�   (33b) 
Substituting these consumption levels into the utility function (1) yields utility equal to 7.11 
in both countries. These values are higher than when only trade in final goods is allowed. 
Therefore, there are additional productivity gains from trading in intermediate as well as final 
goods, as it enables countries to specialise in the intermediate and final goods in which they 
have a comparative advantage. This is what Samuelson (2001) refers to as the “Sraffian 
bonus”: a gain from international trade which goes beyond the gains from the Ricardian 
model.  
 
3.3 Trade and coordination costs: Trade in final goods only 
 
So far the welfare calculations have been performed assuming no coordination or trade costs. 
In this section and the next, we introduce these costs. Coordination costs have been defined in 
Section 2.3 above. For trade costs, suppose that international trade occurs with an iceberg 
trade cost so that for every unit shipped abroad, only 𝜏 <  1 units arrive; 1 − 𝜏 is therefore 
the trade cost. Trade costs are the same for all goods. 
 
Our focus in this section will be on obtaining expressions for the threshold values of trade 
costs such that if trade costs are lower than the threshold values, international trade occurs, 
but otherwise there will be no trade. As noted above in Section 2.3, when both sectors engage 
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in indirect production, the introduction of coordination costs which are identical across 
sectors has no impact on the share of labour used in each sector. Similarly, when there is only 
trade in final goods, trade costs which are identical across sectors can be shown to have no 
impact on the share of labour used in each sector. Consider first the case when firms in both 
sectors engage in indirect production. The consumer’s maximisation problem yields the same 
solution as in equation (3), in terms of domestic prices. On the production side, the relative 
price of 𝑋1 to 𝑋2 in the Home country (the analogue of equation (11)) is a function of 𝜏:  
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2






∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗ �    (34) 
On the other hand, the consumption ratio analogous to equation (12) is now:  
𝐶𝑋2
𝐶𝑋1
 =  𝜏𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿𝑋02∗
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01
 =  𝜏𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐿𝑌2∗
𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1
     (35) 
Hence dividing equation (34) by equation (35), relative expenditure shares on the two final 
goods are the same as in the case without trade and coordination costs, and the solution to the 
labour shares remains as in equations (23a) and (23b). The only difference is that 
consumption of 𝑋2 in Home and 𝑋1 in Foreign is reduced by the trade cost, to 𝜏 times the 
consumption without trade costs. Consumption of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 in the two countries is therefore:  
𝐶𝑋1  =  𝛼𝛽𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01                           𝐶𝑋1∗  =  𝜏(1−𝛼)𝛽𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑋01𝐿�𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+ 𝐴𝑋01    (36a) 
𝐶𝑋2  =  𝜏𝛼𝛽𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿∗�𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗                         𝐶𝑋2∗  =  (1−𝛼)𝛽𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿∗�𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ + 𝐴𝑋02∗    (36b) 
Since trade is assumed to be balanced, comparing the outputs (consumption) in equation (20) 
under indirect production in autarky to those in equations (36a) and (36b) under international 
trade in final goods yields the threshold values of 𝜏𝑋1 and 𝜏𝑋2 above which the two countries 
will benefit from and hence engage in international trade:  
𝜏𝑋1�  =  � 𝛼1−𝛼� �𝐴𝑋01∗  𝐴𝑌1∗  𝐴𝑋11∗𝐴𝑋01  𝐴𝑌1  𝐴𝑋11� �𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑌1∗ 𝐴𝑋11∗ + 𝐴𝑋01∗ � 𝐿∗�𝐿�    (37a) 
𝜏𝑋2�  =  �1−𝛼𝛼 � �𝐴𝑋02𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ � �𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ +𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋22+𝐴𝑋02� 𝐿�𝐿∗�     (37b) 
Given the parameter values defined above, the threshold values of 𝜏𝑋1�  and 𝜏𝑋2�  are 0.56. 
 
On the other hand, suppose that coordination costs are sufficiently high so that direct 
production occurs in both goods. Then once again the trade costs which are identical across 
sectors have no effect on labour shares, so equilibrium consumption levels are reduced by the 
trade cost 𝜏 when the good is imported:  
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𝐶𝑋1  =  𝛼𝐴𝑋1𝐿�                                      𝐶𝑋1∗  =  (1 − 𝛼)𝜏𝐴𝑋1𝐿�    (38a) 
𝐶𝑋2  =  𝛼𝜏𝐴𝑋2∗ 𝐿∗�                                    𝐶𝑋2∗  =  (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝑋2∗ 𝐿∗�     (38b) 
Comparing the consumption under international trade with the consumption/output under 
autarky in equation (5), the threshold values of 𝜏𝑋1�  and 𝜏𝑋2�  are given by:  
𝜏𝑋1�  =  � 𝛼1−𝛼� �𝐴𝑋1∗𝐴𝑋1� 𝐿∗�𝐿�                          𝜏𝑋2�  =  �1−𝛼𝛼 � �𝐴𝑋2𝐴𝑋2∗ � 𝐿�𝐿∗�     (39) 
Substituting from the assumed values of the parameters above yields 𝜏𝑋1� = 𝜏𝑋2� = 0.5. Given 
these parameter values, trade costs can be higher under direct production compared with 
under indirect production, and still allow countries to gain from international trade in final 
goods; however, this result does not generalise to different parameter values.  
 
3.4 Trade and coordination costs: Trade in intermediate and final goods 
 
In this section, we consider the case of international trade in both intermediate and final 
goods. It may seem reasonable from Antras (2003) to assume that the coordination costs in 
international trade exceed those in domestic trade. Let the coordination cost be the same 
across goods. Hence define (1 − 𝛽𝑇) > (1 − 𝛽) as the coordination costs of indirect 
production when the inputs are imported. In this section we seek to obtain the threshold 
values of 𝛽𝑇 such that for values greater than the threshold value, trade in both intermediate 
and final goods will occur, but if not, only trade in final goods (with domestic indirect 
production) will occur as in Section 3.3 above.  
 
Since Home specialises in 𝑋1 and 𝑌2, and Foreign in 𝑋2 and 𝑌1, the production functions are 
now:  
𝑄𝑋1  =  min�𝛽𝑇 𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 , 𝛽𝑇 𝜏𝐴𝑋11𝑄𝑌1∗ �     (40a) 
𝑄𝑋2
∗  =  min�𝛽𝑇 𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿𝑋02∗ , 𝛽𝑇 𝜏𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝑄𝑌2�     (40b) 
The equilibrium conditions are shown in Appendix C. Substituting from the relative labour 
demand conditions (C5), (C6), (C7) and (C8) into the labour market clearing conditions (C9) 
and solving for labour in each of the four sectors yields:  
𝐿𝑋01  =  �𝐵��−1𝐿�                                         𝐿𝑌2  =  �1 − �𝐵��−1� 𝐿�   (41a) 
𝐿𝑋02


















∗ �    (42a) 















�    (42b) 
Notice that, just as in autarky, because we assume that both sectors engage in indirect 
production, and the coordination cost is assumed to be the same across sectors, the 
coordination cost does not enter into the labour allocation across sectors, although the trade 
cost does. The coordination cost however does enter into the production function, resulting in 
a productivity cost and reducing the amount of each final good available for consumption. As 
before, consumption of each good depends on each country’s national income. Following the 
same steps as in Section 3.2, given the symmetry of the model, the value of Home’s national 
income is:  
𝑝𝑋1𝑄𝑋1  =  𝜏𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01𝜏𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ [𝐵�] 𝐿�      (43) 
And Foreign’s national income is:  
𝑝𝑋2
∗ 𝑄𝑋2
∗  =  𝜏𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2+𝐴𝑋02∗
𝜏𝐴𝑋22
∗ 𝐴𝑌2[𝐷�] 𝐿∗�       (44) 
Home’s share of world income is therefore:  











     (45) 
Hence equilibrium consumption in the two countries is:  
𝐶𝑋1  =  𝑆𝐻�𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋01�𝐵��−1𝐿�                     𝐶𝑋1∗  =  �1 − 𝑆𝐻��𝜏𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋01�𝐵��−1𝐿�   (46a) 
𝐶𝑋2  =  𝑆𝐻�𝜏𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋02∗ �𝐷��−1𝐿∗�                   𝐶𝑋2∗  =  �1 − 𝑆𝐻��𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋02∗ �𝐷��−1𝐿∗�    (46b) 
The threshold values of 𝛽𝑇 are obtained by comparing these consumption levels with 
consumption under international trade in final goods only (36a) and (36b):  
𝛽1𝑇�  =  𝛼𝛽𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11[𝐵�]𝑆𝐻��𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋11+𝐴𝑋01�                                𝛽2𝑇�  =  𝛼𝛽𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ [𝐷�]𝑆𝐻��𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ +𝐴𝑋02∗ �   (47) 
Values of 𝛽𝑇 greater than the threshold values mean that output with trade in both 
intermediate and final goods is larger than output with trade in final goods alone. Figure 1 
shows that the threshold values depend positively on the domestic coordination cost 𝛽, while 
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for the parameter values chosen, it is negatively related to the trade cost 𝜏; the relationship 
with 𝛽 is a general result, while the relationship with 𝜏 depends on other parameter values6.  
 
Figure 1: Threshold values of 𝛽1𝑇 as a function of 𝛽 and 𝜏.  
 
 
3.5 A history of the international organisation of production 
 
The previous subsections have shown how production is organised in the world economy 
depending on the coordination and trade costs that exist. In this subsection we consider what 
happens as both trade and coordination costs decrease over time. The outcomes depend in a 
relatively complex way on these trade and coordination costs; hence we offer here an 
example of the parameter values under which different configurations exist.  
 
Suppose initially that both types of costs are very high; for example, 𝛽 = 𝜏 = 0.4 and 
𝛽𝑇 = 0.3. Whilst these may appear to be very large trade costs (equivalent to a trade friction 
of 150%), this is not out of line with the figures quoted in Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2004), who suggest a total trade barrier of 170% in developed countries. With such high 
costs, it is not beneficial to engage in international trade, or indeed to engage in domestic 
6 This can also be seen by substituting(42a),(42b) and (45) into (47). Since 𝛽 does not enter into �𝐵��, �𝐷�� or 
�𝑆𝐻��, there is a direct relationship between 𝛽 and 𝛽1𝑇�  and 𝛽2𝑇� . However, 𝜏 enters into all of �𝐵��, �𝐷�� and �𝑆𝐻��, 
and these appear in both the numerator and denominator of 𝛽1𝑇�  and 𝛽2𝑇� , so 𝜏 has a complicated relationship 


































                                                          
indirect production. This is the situation with Henry Ford’s monolithic factory: firms produce 
final goods directly from raw materials, and there is no international trade.  
 
What happens next depends on whether trade costs decrease faster than coordination costs or 
vice versa. In the former case, suppose that 𝛽 = 0.4, 𝛽𝑇 = 0.3 as before, and 𝜏 increases to 
0.5. This is sufficient to ensure that international trade in final goods with direct production is 
the most beneficial outcome. In this case Home will specialise in 𝑋1 and export it to Foreign 
in exchange for imports of 𝑋2. On the other hand, if coordination costs decrease faster than 
trade costs, then autarky with indirect production will occur, for instance if 𝛽𝑇 = 0.3, and 
𝜏 = 0.4 as before, then 𝛽 = 0.593 is sufficient to obtain this outcome. Therefore, industries 
in which trade costs are relatively low compared to coordination costs will be engaged in 
international trade, whereas industries in which trade costs are relatively high will engage in 
domestic indirect production.  
 
As both trade and coordination costs continue to fall, production begins to take place 
indirectly, although only international trade in final goods continues to occur. For example, 
this occurs if 𝛽𝑇 = 0.3 as before, and 𝛽 = 𝜏 = 0.625. Therefore, as trade and coordination 
costs fall, countries may actually become less specialised as they move from international 
trade with direct production to international trade with indirect production. And finally, when 
the cost of coordinating imported intermediate products is sufficiently small relative to the 
cost of coordinating domestically produced intermediate products (𝛽𝑇 is sufficiently close to 
𝛽), countries will trade both intermediate and final goods, specialising in the production of 
intermediates and final goods in which they have a comparative advantage. This is the 
production structure of the Apple iPod as discussed in the Introduction. Given the parameters 
assumed above, an example of this occurring is when 𝛽 = 𝜏 = 0.65, and 𝛽𝑇 = 0.62.  
 
If inputs are defined as being in the same industry as the final good it is used in, then trade 
will be intra-industry in nature: Home exports 𝑋1 and 𝑌2 in exchange for imports of 𝑋2 and 
𝑌1. Therefore, intra-industry trade can occur only when the cost of transacting internationally 
is not too large relative to the cost of transacting domestically. In addition, similarly to Yi 
(2003), once trade and coordination costs fall to this low level, the volume of trade increases, 
possibly in a nonlinear way, depending on the parameter values. If international standards 
such as ISO certification help to reduce these international transactions costs, then this may 
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provide a justification for the existence of such standards (see for example Clougherty and 




This paper develops a simple model of international trade with 2 countries, 2 final goods, 2 
intermediate goods, and one factor of production. The objective is to explore the structure of 
production that emerges. Both domestic and foreign outsourcing lead to productivity gains. 
Despite the simple setup, the model allows for many possible outcomes, depending on the 
cost of international trade and the cost of coordinating intermediate inputs. When both trade 
and coordination costs are very high, not only is there no international trade, but firms engage 
in direct production of final goods (that is, they do not make use of intermediate inputs 
produced outside the firm). As coordination costs fall, indirect production of final goods 
occurs with the use of domestic intermediate inputs, while as trade costs fall, international 
trade in final goods occurs. Finally, when coordination costs for imported intermediates are 
not too large relative to the coordination costs of domestically produced intermediates, 
international trade occurs in both intermediate and final goods, and production occurs 
indirectly through the use of imported intermediates. Hence as trade costs decrease, the 
international structure of production endogenously becomes more fragmented, and countries 
become more inter-dependent.  
 
The model in this paper has assumed a single factor of production. Whilst this simplifies the 
analysis, it also prevents us from analysing the distributional effects of trade in intermediate 
goods, which has been an important policy issue (see Mankiw and Swagel, 2006). In 
addition, by assuming only one intermediate good for each final good, the model is unable to 
address the possibility that decreasing trade and coordination costs may result in an 
expansion in the range of intermediate inputs being outsourced or offshored. The other key 
omission is heterogeneity across firms, which would allow for different organisational forms 
within each sector. Progress along these lines can be made using a model with more than one 
factor of production, many intermediate goods, and firm heterogeneity of the Melitz (2003) 
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Appendix A: Equilibrium conditions with international trade in final goods 
only 
 
The equilibrium conditions when international trade is allowed in final goods only are as 
follows:  
𝑝𝑋1 = 𝑝𝑋1∗ = 𝑤�𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1+𝐴𝑋01�𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1                      𝑝𝑋2 = 𝑝𝑋2∗ = 𝑤∗�𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗ +𝐴𝑋02∗ �𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗    (A1) 
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2












= 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐿𝑌2∗
𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1































∗ �        (A5) 
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐿𝑌1                     ↔                      𝐿𝑋01 = 𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1𝐴𝑋01 𝐿𝑌1   (A6) 
𝐴𝑋02
∗ 𝐿𝑋02
∗ =  𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗ 𝐿𝑌2∗                     ↔                      𝐿𝑋02∗ = 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2∗𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿𝑌2∗    (A7) 
𝐿𝑋01 +  𝐿𝑌1 =  𝐿�                     𝐿𝑋02∗ +  𝐿𝑌2∗ =  𝐿∗�                      𝑤 = 𝑤∗   (A8) 
 
Appendix B: Equilibrium conditions with international trade in both 
intermediate and final goods 
 
The equilibrium conditions when international trade is allowed in both intermediate and final 
goods are as follows:  
𝑝𝑋1 = 𝑝𝑋1∗ = 𝑤𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝑤∗𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗         (B1) 
𝑝𝑋2 = 𝑝𝑋2∗ = 𝑤∗𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2+𝑤𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2         (B2) 
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2





































∗ =  �1−𝛼𝛼 � �𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑋01� �𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ +𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2+𝐴𝑋02∗ �        (B6) 
𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 =  𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ 𝐿𝑌1∗                     ↔                      𝐿𝑋01 = 𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗𝐴𝑋01 𝐿𝑌1∗    (B7) 
𝐴𝑋02
∗ 𝐿𝑋02
∗ =  𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2                     ↔                      𝐿𝑋02∗ = 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿𝑌2   (B8) 
𝐿𝑋01 +  𝐿𝑌2 =  𝐿�                     𝐿𝑋02∗ +  𝐿𝑌1∗ =  𝐿∗�                      𝑤 = 𝑤∗   (B9) 
 
Appendix C: Equilibrium conditions with trade and coordination costs 
 
The equilibrium conditions when trade in both intermediate and final goods is allowed in the 
presence of trade and coordination costs are (setting 𝑤 =  𝑤∗):  
𝑝𝑋1 = 𝜏𝑝𝑋1∗ = 𝑤�𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ 𝜏+𝐴𝑋01�𝛽𝑇𝜏𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗         (C1) 
𝑝𝑋2 = 𝑝𝑋2∗𝜏 = 𝑤�𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝜏+𝐴𝑋02∗ �𝛽𝑇𝜏2𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2         (C2) 
𝑝𝑋1
𝑝𝑋2
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∗ =  �1−𝛼𝛼 � �𝐴𝑋02∗𝐴𝑋01� �𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ 𝜏+𝐴𝑋01𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝜏+𝐴𝑋02∗ �        (C6) 
𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋01𝐿𝑋01 =  𝛽𝑇𝜏𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗ 𝐿𝑌1∗                ↔                 𝐿𝑋01 = 𝜏𝐴𝑋11𝐴𝑌1∗𝐴𝑋01 𝐿𝑌1∗    (C7) 
𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋02
∗ 𝐿𝑋02
∗ =  𝛽𝑇𝜏𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝐿𝑌2                ↔                 𝐿𝑋02∗ = 𝜏𝐴𝑋22∗ 𝐴𝑌2𝐴𝑋02∗ 𝐿𝑌2    (C8) 
𝐿𝑋01 +  𝐿𝑌2 =  𝐿�                                                              𝐿𝑋02∗ + 𝐿𝑌1∗ =  𝐿∗�   (C9) 
 
Appendix D: Comparison with Samuelson’s (2001) results 
 
The equivalent parameter values used in Samuelson’s (2001) paper are:  
𝐴𝑋1 =  2                     𝐴𝑋2 =  0.5                     𝐴𝑌1 =  0.5                     𝐴𝑌2 =  2    (D1) 
𝐴𝑋01 = 8                      𝐴𝑋11 = 4                      𝐴𝑋02 = 2                      𝐴𝑋22 = 1   (D2) 
𝐴𝑋1




∗ = 2                      𝐴𝑋11∗ = 1                      𝐴𝑋02∗ = 8                      𝐴𝑋22∗ = 4  (D4) 
𝛼 =  0.5                                                             𝐿�  =  𝐿∗� =  1     (D5) 
Given these parameter values, the autarkic utility level is 0.5 under direct production, and is 
0.411 under indirect production. Hence as Samuelson (2001) suggests, under autarky it does 
not make sense to engage in indirect production.  
 
Trade in final goods alone yields utility of 1 – a two-fold increase over the autarkic utility 
level, as Samuelson (2001) finds. Finally, trade in both intermediate and final goods yields 
utility equal to 2 – a two-fold increase over trade in final goods alone, or a four-fold increase 
over the autarkic utility level. This is different from what Samuelson obtains; he gets utility 
equal to 3 when there is trade in both intermediate and final goods. The reason for this 
difference is that Samuelson’s model, by defining intermediate goods as the same as final 
goods, sidesteps the fact that intermediate goods need to be produced before final goods, 
hence enables him to obtain a larger gain from trade in intermediate inputs. In our 
formulation, by decoupling intermediate goods from final goods, we are able to take into 
account this timing issue, and find that the gains from trade in intermediate inputs, whilst 
large, is not as large as that obtained by Samuelson (2001).  
 
In addition, Samuelson (2001) claims that “… all consumptions will become unboundably 
large” (Samuelson, 2001, p. 1207) when labour productivity in converting intermediate inputs 
into final goods 𝐴𝑋01 and 𝐴𝑋02
∗  become very large. This does not happen in our formulation, 
again because we have decoupled intermediates from final goods. Instead, given the values 
above, utility approaches 4 as 𝐴𝑋01 and 𝐴𝑋02
∗  become very large. The reason is that when 
these parameters become very large, almost all labour is used in producing the intermediate 
inputs. Unless labour productivity in these intermediate inputs becomes very large as well, 
simply altering labour productivity in assembling the final product will not yield unbounded 
levels of consumption and utility.   
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